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The Effect of Good Samaritan Laws (GSL) on Opioid Overdose Mortality 
Abstract 
This paper investigates the effects of Good Samaritan Laws on opioid overdose mortality rates in the 
United States. Evaluating policy interventions in response to upticks in opioid mortality is crucial to enact 
federal legislation that protects communities. However, concerns about moral hazard implications could 
have profound impacts on current efforts to combat the epidemic. This paper will look at various policies 
proposed and evaluate the effects of such policies on overall mortality rates, elucidating the moral hazard 
effects of Good Samaritan Laws. 
Keywords 
Opioid Epidemic, health policy, health economics 
Cover Page Footnote 
Dr. Christopher Cornwell's guidance was critical for the empirical work in this manuscript. 






The Effect of Good Samaritan Laws (GSL) on Opioid Overdose Mortality  
I. Introduction  
The opioid crisis has claimed over 72,000 American lives due to overdose in 2017 alone, a two-
fold increase in a decade (Center for Disease Control). This public health emergency has led to 
various policy changes at the state level including the incorporation of Good Samaritan Laws 
(GSL), Standing Order Prescription Laws (SOL), prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMP), 
and the expansion of Medication Assisted Treatment (MAT) facilities into legislation. While 
various studies look at the effect of each of these policies, variations in controls, sample sizes, 
years, and metrics used have led to disagreeing opinions on the effectiveness and impacts of these 
policies (Doleac and Mukherjee, Rees et al). Discrepancies in Medicaid expansion policies and 
reimbursements for opioid use disorder (OUD) treatment further compound the error in comparing 
the effects of these policies between states. Furthermore, many states passed packaged legislation 
with more than one of these policies at the same time, making it difficult to parse out individual 
effects from the effects of the aggregate package (Prescription Drug Abuse Policy System). GSL 
offers legal protection for individuals who provide reasonable medical care to someone who they 
believe is ill or incapacitated. These types of laws protect an individual from prosecution if they 
administer naloxone, an opioid antagonist that reverses the effects of an opioid overdose, without 
mal-intent. SOL allows a layperson to obtain naloxone from a pharmacy without a medical 
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prescription, while PDMP monitors the number of opioids that a doctor prescribes to a patient. 
While SOL was implemented specifically to reduce overdose mortality rates, GSL encompasses a 
wider mandate for any treatment by a layperson, including performing CPR after cardiac arrests 
or inducing vomiting after alcohol poisoning. However, an unintended consequence of GSL 
policies could be an increased rate of overdose, since individuals with OUD may abuse an opioid, 
knowing that a family member or layperson with access to naloxone can deliver life-saving 
treatment and not face legal challenges (Doleac and Mukherjee). This adverse effect led to 
questions concerning the moral hazard of GSL and SOL, which other studies seek to evaluate 
(Doleac and Mukherjee, Rees et al). This paper looks at the impact of GSL on age-adjusted opioid 
overdose mortality rates from 1999-2017, building upon the current literature, while controlling 
for population density, census region, national age-adjusted opioid mortality rate, and state 
unemployment rates.  
II. Empirical Question and Relevant Background 
This paper seeks to evaluate whether there is statistical validity to the question of moral hazard in 
the incorporation of only GSL into state legislation. While SOL was used as a control to verify the 
effects of GSL, this paper primarily focuses on the moral hazard components of GSL. Oftentimes, 
SOL was packaged with other opioid relief related legislation, while GSL would be passed 
independently. Understanding the effects of these policies could have drastic effect on standard 
operating procedure for state legislators to take action to better combat the opioid crisis through 
risk mitigation strategies. The primary sources of data for this study comes from the Center for 
Disease Control’s (CDC) National Vital Statistics System multiple cause of deaths from the years 
1999-2017, accessed in April 2019. Additional sources containing state unemployment rates came 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics for 1999-2017, accessed in April 2019. Finally, information 
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about the status of GLS and SOL laws per state comes from the Prescription Drug Abuse Policy 
System, accessed in April 2019. If the model indicates that there is a positive association between 
GLS with age-adjusted opioid mortality rates, then these results could suggest some moral hazard 
effects in public health policy.  
 
 
III. Empirical Model and Estimation  
Based on the aggregates of these datasets, this paper used longitudinal data, state-based policies, 
and the national age-adjusted opioid mortality rate to create the following predictive model for the 
age-adjusted opioid mortality rate per state.  
Base Model:  
𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑗 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑂𝐿 +  𝛽2𝐺𝑆𝐿 + 𝛽3𝑛𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑗 + 𝛽4𝑐𝑛𝑢𝑚 + 𝛽5𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑛 + 𝛽6𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 
This model sets up the age-adjusted rate opioid mortality rate (𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑗) as the dependent variable, 
while examining the treatment of Good Samaritan Laws (𝐺𝑆𝐿). GSL and SOL were binary 
variables given a value of 0 if the state did not have the treatment in effect in a particular year and 
a 1 if the treatment was instituted. The designation of when a treatment was instituted was 
determined by the year when the legislation was passed and signed into law by the governor for 
each state. A more robust model might have delayed the effect of the treatment by a year to evaluate 
the treatment once it was fully implemented. SOL was included as a control to determine whether 
the potential moral hazard impact was due to GSL or SOL. Since Standing Order Laws were often 
packaged with other pieces of opioid relief legislation, it would have been difficult to parse out the 
individual effects of these laws without including controls for PDMP and Medicaid expansion. 
However, since this paper looks only at the effects of GSL while controlling for SOL, it avoids 
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over-controlling the model. The national age-adjusted opioid mortality rate (nageadj) was used as 
a control to ensure that changes in mortality rates within the states were due to the treatment effects 
rather than national trends or the enactment of federal policies i.e. expansions of cannabis 
dispensaries, roll backs of stringent policing, Medicaid expansion, and the passage of the Patient 
Protection and the Affordable Care Act (ACA), commonly referred to as Obamacare. Changes in 
federal policy would impact aggregate state mortality rates, which would influence national rates. 
That control is critical to ensure that changes in the age-adjusted opioid mortality rate were due to 
the treatment of GSL rather than federal policies. Variations in census regions such as regional 
differences in the Midwest versus the South were also controlled for by cnum. Literature indicates 
that regional differences including prominent industries in the area and licensing laws could have 
effects on opioid overdose mortality rates (Doleac and Muckherjee). A control for census region 
ensures that states with similar political and economic systems are compared with one another. 
Population density was also included as a control (popden), since urban areas tend to have higher 
mortality rates, even though rural areas are more likely to be federally deemed ‘high risk’ areas 
(Doleac and Muckherjee). Finally, a control for state unemployment (unemp) from 1999-2017 was 
included, since the 2008 recession, unemployment rates particularly in manufacturing and mining 
sectors, and the opioid crisis are intertwined in a variety of ways including psychological effects, 
closures of detoxification centers, and reduction of public health spending (Brown and Wehby). 
The ai  considers the unobserved effects in the fixed effects model, which will be described later, 
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Furthermore, omitted variable bias played an important role in the model, since state level 
education levels, law enforcement budgets, and other opioid related policies were not included. 
However, the controls sought to reduce omitted variable bias, since many of the previously 
mentioned factors probably effected the national age-adjusted opioid mortality rate or were 
included in SOL legislation. Specifying the variables included was critical to promote unbiased 
estimators, while minimizing omitted variable bias. This model also assumes a linear relationship 
between the dependent and independent variables and no perfect multicollinearity under Gauss 
Markov assumptions. Both these parameters probably introduce some measurement error into the 
model. The standard errors are included in the regression table to account for heteroscedasticity.  
 
While the pooled OLS might be the appropriate model when run with panel data, unobserved 
heterogeneity is most likely present, due to state specific variations, and is most likely correlated 
with some observed variable. Fixed Effects (FE) exploits within-group variation across 
longitudinal trends to offer a more consistent and precise estimation. When the FE was used, the 
dummy variable i.YearCode was included in the base model to tease out the effects of specific 
years on the model.  
IV. Data 
Since the data were derived from various federal agencies and the legislation enacted from state 
legislators, it is most likely accurate and close approximations to reality. The inclusion of trends 
such as heart attack rates or motor vehicle accidents should have been incorporated into the model 
to ensure that the treatment affected only the dependent variable. If GSL led to significant 
reductions in either of the aforementioned factors, the model would not be valid. In this paper, 
opioid overdose mortality rates were determined by any overdose mortality rate due to opium, 
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heroin, prescription opioids, non-prescription opioids, and synthetic opioids. The only unreliable 
rates were from North Dakota in 2002, 2003, 2006, and 2007. These four years were removed 
from the data set, which lead to an unbalanced panel. However, since the rest of the observations 
are still intact, the model is still reliably robust. The age-adjusted mortality rate was used for both 
the state and national averages, since it allows for comparisons based on underlying age structures 
and prevents conclusions based on differing age distributions of the populations between states.  
 
V. Results 
It is important to contextualize the policies along a longitudinal time frame, therefore, figure 1 
plots the age-adjusted opioid overdose mortality rate over time. This indicates that in all 50 states 
and the District of Columbia, the mortality rate has increased from 1999-2017. This trend 
highlights the variance in mortality between states but also identifies the increased national 
average. The graphs are labeled as Federal Information Processing Standard state codes (FIPS), 
which can be identified alphabetically i.e. graph 1 is Alabama, while graph 56 represents 
Wyoming. Gaps in the graphs are due to exclusion of American Samoa, Puerto Rico etc. from the 
CDC vital statistics report. All government data collection agencies follow the FIPS state codes to 
normalize inter-agency data comparison. New Mexico was the first state, in 2001, to pass 
legislation based on combating the opioid crisis (Prescription Drug Abuse Policy System). Since 
then approximately 48 states have passed either GLS or SOL. Table 1 indicates the pooled 
summary statistics, showing that there are 964 observations total, with the average age-adjusted 
mortality rate around 13.62. There is more SOL compared to GSL nationwide, which this paper 
exploits to parse out the differences between the policies. In Table 2, the means and standard 
deviations are reported for every variable in the regression model for each year that was accounted 
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for in the data. These results indicate that every state had some type of Standing Order Law by 
2017, while only three-quarters of states had a Good Samaritan Law in place. The greatest increase 
in SOL was between 2014 and 2015, which might indicate that studies that ended in 2015 (Doleac 
and Mukherjee, Rees et al), may not account for the effects of the roughly 17 states that passed 
legislation in 2015. Table 3 are the results of the pooled OLS regression, including the year 
dummies to tease out the year effects. The first column looks at the model without the inclusion 
of the Standing Order Law control. GSL are statistically significant at the 99% significant level 
and is positively correlated with mortality rate by a coefficient of 1.88. The adjusted r-squared 
value of the model is 0.47. However, when SOL is re-introduced in the model, seen by column 2, 
it diminishes the significance of GSL. The variable now has a p value of 0.071, which does not 
make it significant at the 95% significance threshold. However, it still significant at 90% and 
continues to be positively correlated with mortality rates. While SOL could be positively associated 
with mortality rates, the lack of statistical significance indicates very little effect on the overall 
rate. The majority of literature, however, indicates that SOL should be negatively correlated with 
mortality rate, so the pooled OLS, since it introduces bias into the model, will be disregarded.  
 
The fixed effects model uses state variations across times in the mortality rate to determine the 
treatment effects. Table 4 column 1 indicates the FE model without the SOL control. This is helpful 
to determine whether there were indeed variations within each state. The results indicate that GSL 
is still positively correlated with mortality rates at a 98% significance level. The national age-
adjusted overdose mortality rate continues to be the best indicator of state mortality rates at a 99% 
significance level. Neither population density nor State unemployment rates were statistically 
significant at the qualifying 90% threshold. After the re-introduction of SOL back into the model 
7
Ramesh: The Effect of Good Samaritan Laws (GSL) on Opioid Overdose Mortal
Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2019
(Table 4, column 2) ceterius paribus, the coefficient for GSL actually becomes greater and it 
becomes significant at the 99% threshold. This model is the most appropriate, since the SOL 
coefficient is negative, albeit not significant, which adheres with most literature. The population 
density control becomes statistically significant and very slightly positively correlated with 
mortality rates, which fits the prevailing theories in the field that rural areas tend to have higher 
overdose mortality rates. Finally, while the state unemployment rate is not significant, the positive 
coefficient indicates that areas with greater unemployment also have higher overdose mortality 
rates, which also fits in with the prevailing literature base. The year dummies were included in the 
regression models in order to capture the effects of aggregate trends. None of the dummies were 
significant in any of the models, indicating that the aggregate trends did not play an important role 
in the dependent variable.  
VI. Conclusion 
The positive association between GSL and age-adjusted opioid overdose mortality rates indicate 
that moral hazard might be an unintended consequence of Good Samaritan Laws. While this does 
not indicate any causal relationship between GSL and mortality rates, it does verify the findings of 
Doleac’s study in certain regards. The presence of moral hazard is very difficult to test, but the 
positive association might suggest that it requires further investigation with expanded controls with 
a robust model to develop a more precise estimator of the effect of GSL on mortality rates. If 
further studies reach similar conclusions, then policy makers are faced with an important decision 
regarding the effectiveness of Good Samaritan legislation. The effects of moral hazard could 
outweigh any tangential positive benefits of legal protection. Perhaps removing the legal protection 
but encouraging local prosecutors not to press charges for naloxone administration by a layperson 
would reduce the incentive for risky behavior from individuals suffering from OUD. The opioid 
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crisis continues to drastically effect the lives of Americans but understanding the underlying trends 






Figures and Tables 
  
Figure 1: Each graph represents a different state. The overall trend indicates that age-adjusted 
opioid overdose mortality death rates have increased from 2000-2017. The mortality rate is per 
100,000 individuals in the state. The graphs are labeled as Federal Information Processing 
Standard state codes (FIPS), which can be identified alphabetically i.e. graph 1 is Alabama, 
while graph 56 represents Wyoming. Gaps in the graphs are due to exclusion of American 
Samoa, Puerto Rico etc. from the CDC vital statistics report. 
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Table 2: Identifies the mean and standard deviations for each variable included in the regression 
model for each year in the data. The mean is represented by the top number, while the standard 
deviation is represented by the bottom number.  
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Table 3: Shows the pooled OLS results of the regression with and without the Standing Order 
Law control.  
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Table 4: Shows the Fixed effects model of the regression with and without the Standing Order 
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